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Tim Engartner
Less Government is Good Government?  
Deregulation as an Undermining Principle of Financial Markets1 
Since liberalization became the dominant global narrative the stock response to market shortcomings has been 
to “slim down” the state and deregulate. In most countries the slogan of “less government is good government” 
has become a constitutive feature of economic policy since the 1980s. Markets lie at the heart of every success-
ful economy, and despite not necessarily working well on their own, the economic policy of deregulation has 
been one of the most persistent currents in the global economy. Based as it is on classical liberalism and – at 
least in its origins and leanings – neoclassical theory, deregulation aims to minimize the influence of the state. 
But in the context of the current financial and economic meltdown – the worst economic dislocation since the 
Great Crash of 1929-32 – “downsizing” the state causes growing turmoil. Global networking has made financial 
markets much more volatile and therefore much more susceptible to crisis.
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When on Sunday the fifteenth of September 2008 the 
American economy stood on the brink of its most se-
vere economic crisis since 1929, an eye-witness com-
mented on the fall of Lehman Brothers in colourful 
language: “Pier 6, beside the East River. The ‘Masters 
of the Universe’ – as Tom Wolfe described the Wall 
Street elite in The Bonfire of the Vanities – arrive in 
quick succession at the Downtown Manhattan He-
liport. It takes them five minutes by limousine to 
a fine address with Carrara marble floors and Swiss 
pear-wood panelling: 745 Seventh Avenue, round the 
corner from Wall Street. The CEOs of America’s big-
gest banks are gathering this evening at the scene. If 
they fail to act tonight all hell will be let loose when 
the Asian markets open. New Yorkers are used to see-
ing their great offices towers lit up through the night, 
but the atmosphere this Sunday is different. Fear is 
palpable. Fear of a collapse on Wall Street, fear of a col-
lapse on the international financial markets. Cameras 
and TV crews crowd the sidewalk in front of Lehman 
Brothers’ headquarters as black limousines deliver 
bankers and politicians. The only question that mat-
ters this evening: is Lehman Brothers too big to fail? 
Will the bank – turnover sixty billion dollars – have 
to be saved? US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is 
in charge of this piece of open-heart surgery on the 
1 The author would like to thank both reviewers for very con-
structive and detailed comments.
American economy. He was also once CEO of Leh-
mann rival Goldman Sachs. His answer is “no”. Rescue 
refused. Lehmann Brothers, venerable investment 
bank and for 150 years one of the standard-bearers 
of international finance, is bankrupt. In the days that 
follow, thousands of bankers and analysts leave the 
building for the last time carrying cardboard boxes 
containing their personal effects. Only a week ago 
among country’s top earners, they are haggard from 
sleepless nights and shocked by the mercilessness of 
contemporary capitalism.”
Regardless of how we evaluate this personal insight 
into a situation that with hindsight we might one day 
name historical, the crisis – commonly considered as 
the worst downturn since the Great Depression 75 
years earlier – has shattered the faith in unfettered 
and deregulated markets that correct their mistakes 
quickly (Reinhart, Rogoff 2009). Since the commercial-
ization of the grain trade in late-nineteenth-century 
Chicago it has been common knowledge that the im-
pact of market forces is nowhere more effective, and 
sometimes fateful, than on the floors of the exchan-
ges. But – as governments all over the world imple-
ment packages costing billions to save distressed 
companies, reassure anxious citizens and prevent 
their economies from sliding into the worst calamity 
since the Great Depression of 1929-32 – it still raises 
questions of how the market as a ‘spontaneous order’ 
could lose its fundament and demanded a strong 
state to take matters in hand. Governments of all co-
lours have acquired stakes in the former giants of the 
financial world: Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan in New 
York, RBS and Lloyds/HBOS in London, Dexia and For-
tis in Brussels.
Assuming that markets lie at the heart of every suc-
cessful economy, but do not work well on their own 
under any circumstances, this paper tries to track one 
of the most persistent currents in global economy: de-
regulation. It tries to clarify the design and impact of 
deregulation concepts which – according to my thesis 
– triggered the 2008/09 financial crisis. Nevertheless, 
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the following arguments are not based on the current 
crisis, but rather cast light on the intellectual founda-
tion of deregulation as a highly influential economic 
current. Necessarily, the paper focuses on concepts 
and consequences of deregulation on a very general 
scale. The universalization of market concepts (chap-
ter 2), i.e. the tendency to disparage differences be-
tween different types of markets such as the goods 
market, the labour market, the traffic market and the 
financial market, is connected to neoclassic equilib-
rium theory (chapter 3) as well as to fundamental pa-
rameters that gave rise to market liberalization (chap-
ter 4). The arguments presented in this paper cannot 
be drawn on solely to explain the financial meltdown, 
but must be amended by further explanations. There 
are various other causes for the financial turmoil that 
finally affected the real economy, amongst them such 
as asset-liability mismatches, information uncertain-
ties and herd behaviour. Notwithstanding deregula-
tion politics can be qualified as a determinant ‘under-
lying carpet’.
1. Introduction 
For more than a quarter century the ‘deregulation 
doctrine’ prevailed and in line with the view that 
regulation impedes innovation, inefficiencies of regu-
latory frameworks have been outlined – and partly 
overdrawn (Stiglitz 2010, xi). Against this background 
the Managing Director of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Dominique Strauss-Kahn, explained the fi-
nancial crisis by addressing the “regulatory failure to 
guard against excessive risk-taking in the financial sys-
tem, especially in the US” (2008). However, to some 
extent regulation is counterproductive and amplifies 
market dysfunctions. Notably, the Basel II Accord 
has come under scrutiny for forcing banks to increase 
their capital when risks rise, which causes them to de-
crease lending exactly when capital is scarce, contin-
gently aggravating financial crises.
State interventions as we saw them in response to 
the recent collapse of the financial markets represent 
quite a U-turn, given that for more than a quarter 
century the “control deficits of the state and within 
the state” have been stressed and the benefits of the 
“lean state” held high (Jänicke 1993, 65). Under that 
logic state interventions to correct market outcomes 
or overall economic planning to pursue society-wide 
or social policy aims were a long time considered as 
alien interference. For many economists such inter-
ventions represent a “usurpation of knowledge” that 
ultimately ends in totalitarianism (Hayek 1975). But 
although the current tempest in the international 
capital markets now causes numerous economists to 
cease their public demands for “humility before the 
market’s unpredictability” (Hayek 2001, 47), liberaliza-
tion politics must still be regarded as an immensely 
influential intellectual current whose principles and 
tenets define the international frame of reference for 
social and economic policy. Thus, the transformation 
of the Keynesian welfare state into a “Schumpeterian 
workfare state” (Jessop 1993) in pursuit of the need 
to secure international competitiveness continues un-
abated in most developed industrial states.
2. Universalization of Market Concepts 
Based as it is on classical liberalism and – at least in 
its origins and leanings – neoclassical theory, the 
economic policy of deregulation (and privatization) 
aims to minimize the influence of the state. Whereas 
‘liberalization’ is commonly defined as the opening 
of closed markets, a stronger accentuation of market 
forces and a selective task sharing between market 
and public sector, the term ‘deregulation’ – having its 
roots in the US-American debate about basic elements 
of a political order – primarily focuses on waiving 
market barriers, price controls, terms and conditions 
as well as laws that legitimate governance control. 
The deregulation discourse cherry-picks fundamen-
tal ideas from the classical liberalism of Adam Smith, 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, regurgitating 
them to fit the changed circumstances of the politi-
cal economy. Unlike the “old” laissez-faire liberalism 
that emerged in opposition to protectionist mercanti-
lism, neoliberalism regards economic interventions as 
necessary to ensure functioning markets, true to the 
spirit of “liberal interventionism” (Rüstow 1963, 253).
With the goal of the broadest possible realization 
of the ideal of total competition intervention in the 
eco nomy was now to be “in exactly the opposite di-
rection, namely concurrent with the laws of the mar-
ket rather than against them” (Rüstow 1963, 252-253). 
Rüstow, who taught at Istanbul University as a Ger-
man exile from 1933 to 1949, is much more explicit 
in the immediately preceding passage: “The much-ma-
ligned Manchester capitalism has at least revealed a 
much more manly and courageous attitude than those 
whiners who immediately get the public authorities 
to stick the biggest possible plaster on the slightest 
scratch” (1932, 251). The above quote shows that as 
a system of ideas this new liberalism was about more 
than a resurrection of traditional liberalism: namely, a 
fundamental realignment of social and economic poli-
cy. On the basis of the neoclassical equilibrium theory 
– developed in the last third of the nineteenth century 
out of classical economics – according to which the 
market possesses efficient incentive, control and pen-
alty mechanisms, the supporters of this liberal turn ar-
gued for the primacy of the economy, for an economic 
policy of antistatism (Moore 1983, 93).
Assuming perfect capital markets, the neoclassi-
cal perspective holds the “money view”, according to 
which consumption and investment are affected by 
interest rates regardless of potential institutional in-
tervention. Consistent with neoclassical theory, mo-
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netary policy-makers have certain objectives, such as 
moderate long-term interest rates, stable prices, and 
the promotion of sustainable economic growth in or-
der to provide sound macroeconomic conditions for a 
thriving economy. In neoclassical theory, the alloca-
tion of resources and equilibrium prices, fundamental 
in a market based financial system, remains unaffect-
ed by institutional structures. But the recent past illus-
trates how market friction provides reliable insights 
into the inherent dynamics of the institutional struc-
ture of the financial system.
The traditional concept of financial intermediation, 
namely to accomplish a welfare-improving safeguard 
against fluctuations in financial market returns, was to 
a significant degree abandoned when market partici-
pants were no longer protected against competition. 
As the optimal structure of risk-bearing is a key func-
tion of a financial system, a drawback of market-based 
systems is that investors are exposed to substantial 
market risk, when they rely on market information 
that trigger changes in asset prices. This reliance re-
quires financial institutions and publicly traded cor-
porations to disclose more information than privately 
held companies in bank-based systems (cf. Geithner 
2009).
The “dethroning” of politics entails a wide range of 
measure: implementing competition through compre-
hensive deregulation of the economic and social or-
der, liberalization and privatization of public services 
and publicly owned businesses, tax cuts in tandem 
with cutting state spending, and restrictive monetary 
policy (Bellamy 1994). But how can the universality of 
the free-market principle be justified, the broad-brush 
fixation on the market as the central instance of coor-
dination? Gary S. Becker, who won the 1992 Swedish 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences (often referred to 
as a “Nobel prize” although it is awarded in memory 
of Alfred Nobel rather than by his foundation) formu-
lated the benefits of the free-market principle in terms 
of its universal validity: “Indeed, I have come to the 
position that the economic approach is a compre-
hensive one that is applicable to all human be havior, 
be it behavior involving money prices or imputed 
shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, emo-
tional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men 
or women, adults or children, brilliant or stupid per-
sons, patients or therapists, businessmen or politi-
cians, teachers or students” (1978, 8). The originators 
themselves described the universalization of the free 
market, expressed in the desire to apply cost/benefit 
considerations to all spheres of society, as “economic 
imperialism” (Boulding 1973, 118; Schlösser 2001, 4), 
strikingly highlighting the messianic dimension of 
this redefined liberalism.
Charles E. Lindblom sees the superiority of the mar-
ket over a system of central coordination grounded in 
the former’s evolutionary potential: “Market systems 
encourage thousands and millions of initiatives. They 
are turbulent, open-ended systems that can change or 
grow at any of innumerable points. They allow great 
room for invention and improvisation, individual and 
local resourcefulness, a multitude of challenges and 
potential responses …” (1980, 77). Market economies 
are claimed to be extraordinarily adaptable evolu-
tionary systems driven by competition as the central 
coordinating mechanism (Weizsäcker 2000, 2-3; Knieps 
2000, 7-22; Donges 2002, 7-11).
The supporters of intense competition at all levels 
from individual to international claim that it solves 
the innovation problem by functioning as “abstract 
knowledge management”; businesses competing 
with one another in pursuit of profit (which repre-
sents the result of a competitive advantage) drives 
technical progress, inducing growth, innovation 
and growing market share. Competitive structures 
are also regarded as significant in resolving motiva-
tion problems through the mechanism whereby per-
forming adequately in the market earns companies 
profits whereas inefficiencies lead to losses and in the 
longer term elimination from the market.
The view that the free market filters out the best 
methods and behaviour, is not restricted to competi-
tion between businesses, but also encompasses com-
petition between nation-states (Standortwettbewerb). 
In short: competition functions as a regulatory prin-
ciple acting to order and channel market forces. At 
the same time, competition – in the opinion of those 
who regard it as the only driving force of general well-
being apart from self-interest – can only express its 
ordering powers if it is managed and institu tionally 
secured by the state.2 The market must not just be 
permitted but much more permanently facilitated. Ul-
timately, historical experience shows that the free 
play of market forces alone could not be expected to 
produce a market order of economic processes, but 
that instead the state had to guarantee the survival 
of competition on the field of competing interests as 
a “robust umpire” (Röpke 1979, 310) rather than just a 
“night-watchman” (Lassalle 1919, 195).
3. Weighty Borrowings from Neoclassicism
One central pillar of neoclassical economics – on 
which numerous deregulation arguments are at 
least implicitly based – is the theory of equilibrium, 
according to which the market is automatically self-
optimizing (i.e. its allocation function always tends 
towards equilibrium). Many representatives of the 
economic fraternity regard Adam Smith’s oft-quoted 
quasi-religious metaphor of the “invisible hand” as 
“perhaps the major intellectual discovery in the whole 
2 Leonhard Miksch described the free-market economy as a “Ver-
anstaltung”, because the state appeared as an ordering instance 
to guarantee the functioning of competition (1937, 5 and 9).
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history of economics” (Buchanan 1986, 17). Here the 
metaphoric expression stands for the condition that 
is generally understood as the spontaneously price-
controlled order of market events.
Hayek’s implicit equilibrium of a market order 
that forms spontaneously of itself describes a mar-
ket emerging as the coordinating instance by secur-
ing interaction of the economic subjects, regardless 
whether this is the labour, commodity or capital mar-
ket (1969). Although Adam Smith’s striking image 
pertinently illustrates the way the coordinating effect 
of the market is often hidden from view, the theoreti-
cal concept of neoclassical economics has come in for 
criticism not only as a metaphorical exaggeration but 
even as a gap in economic theory tending towards 
economic theology.
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock responded 
to this criticism with an economics orientated on the 
“world as it is” rather than the “world as it should be”. 
Their public choice theory, which must be regarded 
as further evidence of the immense breadth of varia-
tion and versatility of deregulation theory, became 
one of the most influential economic theories of the 
past century. The constitutive feature of the theory, 
also known as “new political economy”, is the appli-
cation of the rational choice approach of neoclassical 
economics (which holds that the goal of maximizing 
utility determines individual decision-making calcula-
tions) to phenomena in the political sphere.
Buchanan’s academic reputation is grounded in 
his contribution to a free-market reconception of 
the state, in the sense of a critique of the (welfare) 
state couched in terms of political economy; unlike 
many contemporary protagonists of a deregulation 
turn, the thrust of his argument is not to attack na-
tion-state socialism, but instead to make what lib-
eral economists felt was the “mushrooming” welfare 
state the starting point of his critique, “Socialism Is 
Dead But Leviathan Lives On” (Buchanan, 1990). The 
award-winning economist declared the absence of 
free-market principles and the utility maximization of 
politicians to be the causes of state bureaucracy. Thus, 
Ralf Dahrendorf’s call to  banish “the talk of a good 
society” from the vocabulary of the social sciences 
because openness and liberty in a society were “ab-
solutely adequate goals” (2000: 15) finds a broad echo 
among economists, historians and political scientists. 
By contrast they regard any orientation on the com-
mon good as “preceptorially imposed virtuousness” 
(Willke 2003, 68).
According to deregulation politics the market repre-
sents a system of rules that excludes the application 
of categories such as justice and social acceptability 
(cf. Etzioni 1988). In fact the costs of social inclusion 
are simply never set in relation to the costs that en-
sue – in the form of criminality, ghettoization, squalor, 
drug addiction, etc. – as a consequence of social tur-
moil and disparities. The historical roots of this short-
sighted perspective are found in Hayek’s famous 
statement about the Keynesian welfare state: “A so-
cial market economy is not a market economy, a social 
constitutional state not a constitutional state, a social 
conscience not a conscience, social justice not justice 
and, I fear, social democracy not democracy” (1979, 
16).3 Those who interpret the predicate “social” as a 
meaningless pleonasm or as a “weasel-word” (Hayek 
1979, 16) and regard the free market as a moral con-
cept consistently resist any subsequent correction of 
the results of the market.
However, the postulate that if the free market is to 
rule one must adapt to and fit in with it (Eucken 1952, 
371) is subject to justified objections. Moderate and 
radical critics of deregulation criticize both the rig-
orousness of the market and its anonymity. Whereas 
Richard Sennett, whose The Corrosion of Charac ter: 
The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capi-
talism analyses global capitalism’s demands on its 
subjects, sees the “profit imperative” as the reason 
for capitalism to rid itself of all responsibility (1998), 
others criticize the return to Manchester capitalism 
as sheer “market fundamentalism” (Giddens 1990). 
 Critics from ethical communitarian currents complain 
of the lack of state institutions to provide a social 
counterweight to the market when they see “individu-
als … as quivering atoms abandoned to the chill of 
neoliberalism” (Reese-Schäfer 2001, 131). Harsher criti-
cism of the reformatting of liberalism – widely lauded 
as economia triumfans – comes from those who iden-
tify destructive elements with respect to the develop-
ment of society above and beyond the points of criti-
cism already mentioned. Whether claiming that the 
market is under any circumstances inherently stable is 
the same as a quasi-religious message may be a moot 
point, but it serves to illustrate a persistent criticism. 
It is generally believed that “there is no alternative” 
to the course of economic renewal “that sets social 
romanticism to one side” (Sinn and Sinn 1993, 485). 
Until the current economic and financial crisis erupt-
ed even prominent sceptics eked out a marginal exis-
tence without any meaningful media resonance.
In order to understand the role of the slimmed 
down state it is worth taking a look back at its ori-
gins. The deregulation doctrine was able to establish 
itself as the predominant paradigm of political econ-
3 While many observers regard Germany’s Social Market Econo-
my as a highly ambitious and extremely successful (“economic 
miracle”) blueprint for a coordinated economy cum welfare 
state, the original conception was in fact designed in opposi-
tion to Keynesian and other ideas in favor of extensive state 
planning for economic and social purposes. At the same time 
the founding fathers of the Social Market Economy critiqued 
classical laisser faire liberalism in order to create considerable 
room for maneuvers needed to cut political deals with a strong 
socialist and trade union opposition in post WW II Germany.
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omy. First under Margaret Thatcher in Britain and 
Ronald Reagan in the United States and subsequently 
in most of the states of continental Europe there has 
been a “passive revolution” (cf. Gramsci 1971, 44-120). 
Ideas of the welfare state, pillars of public services 
and historically evolved sectors of state economic 
activi ty that had once been matters of public consen-
sus came under a barrage of criticism from all sides. 
At the latest by the end of the “short century” as Eric 
Hobsbawm named the era of “real existing socialism” 
from 1917 to 1989 (1995, 20), the efforts to imple-
ment market doctrine not only as the roadmap for 
efficient economic policy but also as the solution to 
social and ecological ills had been rewarded. For two 
decades now the very tangible and visible outcome 
has been a widely accepted dominance of deregulat-
ed markets.
If we search for an explanation for the victorious 
march of deregulation politics, deeper questions have 
to be answered: What were the driving forces that 
helped this economic policy to achieve acceptance 
across the obvious traditional (party) political bound-
aries? Were the years of reiterating the necessity to re-
duce state spending and business overheads all it took 
to clear the way for it? Why did the macroeconomic 
and political framework change in such a way as to 
foster the paradigm shift in very different nation-
state economies? 
4.  Driving Forces: Crisis of Keynesianism, 
Faith in Flexibility and Credo of 
Modernity
One obvious explanation why liberalism was able to 
return with such vehemence is the oil price shock of 
1973 and the ensuing recession, the worst since the 
Great Depression, which led to stagflation, currency 
turbulence, a drastic drop in consumption and invest-
ment, worsening deficits in social security systems, 
and finally to a huge jump in unemployment rates. 
Growing functional deficiencies of Western econo-
mies accompanied by a deliberate discrediting of 
state interventions led to a delegitimation of Keynes-
ianism. The traditional mechanisms of state action, in-
cluding demand-side management, were increasingly 
regarded as inadequate.
Here the “Waterloo of Keynesianism” (Willke 2003, 
32) is sometimes explained in terms of the political ac-
tors finding themselves in a dilemma, at least subjec-
tively, because of rampant stagflation: while raging 
inflation demanded a restrictive monetary policy on 
the part of the central banks, a situation of stagnating 
economic growth appeared to indicate state-initiated 
growth programmes. Under the assumption that re-
strictive monetary policy and expansive economic 
policy were mutually exclusive, the crucial political 
decision-makers declared that the Keynesian approach 
was stymied for that period – not least because the 
dilemma was interpreted primarily as a crisis of state 
control as a consequence of over-regulation.
Another reason why the idea of entirely deregulated 
markets was apparently able to succeed by stealth ap-
pears to lie in its adaptability and versatility: “There 
is nothing in the principles of liberalism to make it a 
stationary creed, there are no hard-and-fast rules fixed 
once and for all. The fundamental principle that in the 
ordering of our affairs we should make as much use 
as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and 
resort as little as possible to coercion, is capable of 
an infinite variety of applications” (Hayek 2001, 17). 
This quote reveals that Hayeks positioning occurs not 
so much in the framework of a coherent, static body 
of theory, but rather latches as required into specific 
aspects of the life of society. 
Economization concepts based on deregulation 
and privatization permeated the different spheres 
of socie ty quietly and subtly rather than openly and 
brashly. Concepts gained traction through the creep-
ing influence of think tanks on media, politics and 
business, given that there were “no work and no au-
thors to deal a death-blow to the old teachings … to 
replace old pillars with new” (Flassbeck 1982, 75). Both 
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) and Popper’s two-
volume The Open Society and Its Enemies published 
a year later (1945) had an enormous and unforeseen 
impact on the field of social theory, but they did not 
bring about a paradigm change in economic, financial 
and social policy. 
Already at the beginning of the twentieth century 
Hans Honegger – addressing Max Weber’s political 
economy – pointed out that attempts to order all 
aspects of society through the model of the market 
were misguided, even claiming that “the economy 
is fundamentally rooted in politics, through which 
it must ultimately be explained” (1925, 135). And 
also in the writings of the great ordoliberal Wilhelm 
Röpke – who called at the founding meeting of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society in April 1947 for an economic 
order of “economic humanism” – we find an early 
hint of the criticism associated to this day with the 
(sometimes overused) concept of deregulation: “We 
know well enough that it would be foolish to suppose 
competition, the free market and the interplay of sup-
ply and demand to be mechanisms from which we 
can expect the best in all spheres under all circum-
stances. This general notion – which no-one should 
take more to heart than the friend of the free-market 
economy – leads us to the specific recognition that 
the market … one-sidedly favours activity that is the 
source of profit, while arguments against such activ-
ity are disregarded in the market even though the 
general interest demands they should be given the 
greatest weight” (1979, 200).
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5. Conclusion
The worst economic dislocation since the Great Crash 
of 1929-32 demonstrates that global networking has 
made free markets much more volatile and therefore 
much more susceptible to crises. First and foremost, 
the great shake-out in the global financial casino is 
a time to rethink the relationship between the state 
and the ‘financial economy’ – and here or there re-
adjust – after first setting aside the philosophy of 
destratification. The battle-cry since the end of the 
Bretton Woods system in 1973, that the state must 
withdraw from the commanding heights of the fi-
nancial markets, is weakened. Instead governments 
across the globe agree that the financial markets 
have to undergo significant change – entailing a re-
duced exposure to counterparty risk, to mitigated 
funding mismatches, and to investors that bet on 
their ‘investments’ by leverage in trading. Time 
will show whether deregulation proposals will be 
checked more thoroughly before implementation in 
the future. Currently, decisive regulatory frameworks, 
which are backed by the vast majority of economists, 
are discussed across the globe in order to safeguard 
the global economy. 
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